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Detecting Informed Trading Activities in the Options Markets
Abstract
We develop a statistical approach to detect informed trades in options markets.
The method is applied to 9.6 million of daily option prices. Empirical results suggest
that option informed trades tend to cluster prior to certain events, generate easily large
gains exceeding millions, are not contemporaneously reflected in the underlying stock
price, and involve liquid options during calm times and cheap options during turbulent
times. These findings are not driven by false discoveries in informed trades which are
controlled using a multiple hypothesis testing technique. Pricing, policy, and market
efficiency implications of these findings are discussed.
Keywords: Massive dataset, False Discovery Rate, Options Trades, Open Interest, In-
formed Trading
JEL Classification: G12, G13, G14, G17
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1 Introduction
Informed trading activities play a key role in financial markets. Asset prices will eventu-
ally reflect relevant information because of trading activities of informed investors. This
is important because virtually any financial activity, such as investment decisions, capital
allocations or risk measurements, is affected by current asset prices, which should reflect the
fundamental values of the assets. While the existence of informed trading is well documented
in the empirical literature, very little is known about the characteristics of informed trades.
The goal of this paper is to provide a detail analysis in order to understand when option
informed trading happens, under what circumstances, and which options are involved.
We develop two statistical methods to detect option informed trades. The first method
uses only ex-ante information and aims to detect option informed trades as soon as they
take place. We look for option trades characterized by unusually large increments in open
interest, i.e., number of outstanding contracts, which are close to daily trading volumes. In
those cases the originator of such transactions is not interested in intraday speculations but
has reasons for keeping her position for a longer period. Applying this simple rule to our
dataset, we find that the higher the increment in open interest and volume the higher the
future return of the corresponding option. This finding is consistent with informed traders
being the originators of the large increments in open interest and volume. An important
question is whether truly informed investors or simply lucky traders were behind those large
gains. To answer this question we develop a formal test based on multiple hypothesis testing
techniques to control for false discoveries. We refine the first method using a nonparametric
test to check whether those option trades are hedged with the underlying asset or used for
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hedging purposes. Our second method to detect option informed trading uses also ex-post
information and encompasses the first method by adding an additional criterion. An option
trade is identified as informed when the increment in open interest and volume is unusual,
not hedged (as in the first method), and generates large option gains.
Our approach to detect option informed trading is different from previous methods in
at least two dimensions: it controls for false discoveries in informed trades and accounts for
option hedging. Addressing these issues is a challenging task. In any statistical method, the
probability that an uninformed option trade will appear to be informed simply by chance is
not zero. This misclassification is induced by the Type I error in hypothesis testing, as the
test of option informed trade is repeated each day. However, this misclassification error can
be formally quantified using multiple hypothesis testing techniques. Intuitively, uninformed
option traders should achieve zero return on average, while informed traders should enjoy
statistically large returns. Under the null hypothesis that all traders are uninformed, the
proportion of lucky traders depends on the size of the test and can be calculated using
option returns. When the difference between the actual fraction of large returns (due to
informed and lucky traders) and the expected fraction of large returns due to lucky traders
is statistically large, the test rejects the null hypothesis that all traders are uninformed. We
also estimate the fraction of truly informed options traders.
We develop a nonparametric test to assess whether option hedging takes place or not.
For example, when studying long positions in call options, the idea is to decompose the
underlying stock seller-initiated trading volume in the hedging and non-hedging components.
This decomposition is achieved using the theoretical amount of stock trading which would
have been generated if no option informed trading would have occurred. Then the test rejects
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the null hypothesis of absence of hedging when the hedging component is statistically large.
We undertake an extensive empirical analysis of option informed trading. We apply the
two statistical methods to 9.6 million of daily options prices of 31 selected companies mainly
from airline, banking and insurance sectors. Several millions of intraday stock price and
volume data are also analyzed to assess whether an option trade is hedged or not. The
sample period spans 14 years, from January 1996 to September 2009 (the first part of our
sample ends in April 2006), and our analysis is at the level of individual option, rather than
on the cross-section of stock returns.1
Our main empirical findings are summarized as follows. First, detected option informed
trades tend to cluster prior to certain events such as merger or acquisition announcements
(M&A), quarterly financial or earning related statements, the terrorist attacks of September
11th, and first announcements of financial disruptions of banking and insurance companies
during the Subprime financial crisis 2007–2009. We note that only undertaking an extensive
empirical analysis this finding could emerge. Second, prior to a particular event which will
impact a particular company, informed trading can involve more than one option but rarely
the cheapest option, i.e., deep out-of-the-money and with shortest maturity. This finding
is consistent with informed investors trading fairly liquid options and attempting not to
immediately reveal their private signals. We detect informed trades in cheap options mainly
during the Subprime crisis prior to financial disruption announcements. Third, the majority
of detected informed trades take place in put rather than call options. This finding has to
1As mentioned above, we rely on statistical methods to detect option informed trades. Therefore, those
trades will be informed only with a certain probability. For brevity, we refer to those trades simply as option
informed trades. Moreover, detected informed trades might or might not be legal. From a legal viewpoint
this study does not constitute proof per se of illegal activities. Legal proof would require trader identities
and their motivations, information which is not contained in our dataset.
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be cautiously interpreted as corporate insiders may use put options to hedge human capital
risk.2 Fourth, estimated option gains of informed traders easily exceed several millions for a
single event. Those gains are likely to be realized as they correspond to actual trades. Finally,
the underlying stock price does not display any particular behavior on the day of the detected
option informed trade. Only some days later, for example when a negative company news is
released, the stock price drops generating large gains in long put positions. Although we use
publicly available data to detect option informed trading, it appears that the information
content of such trading is not contemporaneously impounded into the underlying stock price.
As an example, our statistical method detects four informed put option trades on EUREX
between April and June 2006 with the underlying being EADS, the parent of plane maker
Airbus. These trades precede the June 14th, 2006 announcement that deliveries of the
superjumbo jet A380 would be delayed by a further six months period, causing a 26% fall in
the underlying stock, and a total gain of approximately €8.7 million in these option trades.
Some economists even view insider trading as informed trading and argue that laws
making insider trading illegal should be revoked. Milton Friedman, laureate of the Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economics, said: “You want more insider trading, not less. You want to
give the people most likely to have knowledge about deficiencies of the company an incentive
to make the public aware of that.” Friedman believed that any constraint to informed
traders should be removed and that buying or selling pressure is sufficient to impound new
2Human capital is defined as the sum of the present value of the future cash income, shares, stock options,
etc., and it represents the most significant risk faced by corporate insiders especially senior managers. To
the extent it is legal, a long put option is probably the only liquid instrument that can be used by corporate
insiders to hedge the risk attached to their human capital. As information about trading behaviors of
individual corporate insiders is not available, we cannot disentangle whether put option trades are due to
informed traders or corporate insiders hedging their human capital. Human capital risk does not affect
informed trading in call options.
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information into asset prices. While this phenomenon may occur in stock markets, our
findings suggest that it does not take place in the options markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on informed
trading. Section 3 introduces our method to detect option informed trades. Section 4
describes the dataset. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 quantifies false
discoveries in option informed trades. Section 7 discusses various robustness checks. Section 8
concludes.
2 Related Literature
Several studies have documented informed trading activities both in stock and option mar-
kets; see, e.g., Hasbrouck (1991), Easley and O’Hara (1992), Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas
(1998), Poteshman (2006), and Boulatov, Hendershott, and Livdan (2012). Keown and
Pinkerton (1981) report statistical evidence of (illegal) informed stock trading up to 12 days
before the first public announcement of a proposed merger. Christophe, Ferri, and Angel
(2004) document abnormal short-selling before scheduled corporate earnings announcements.
Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) provide related evidence studying bid-ask spreads and mar-
ket depths. However, as discussed in Grossman (1977), Diamond and Verrechia (1987), and
others, option markets offer significant advantages to informed traders as opposed to stock
markets. Options provide potential downside protection, an alternative way of short selling
when shorting stocks is expensive or forbidden, additional leverage which might not be pos-
sible in stock or bond markets (Biais and Hillion (1994)), and possibly more discreetness for
trading on private signals. Indeed, Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005) show that call-volume im-
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balances prior to unscheduled takeover announcements are strongly related to stock returns
on the announcement day. Pan and Poteshman (2006) report clear evidence that option
trading volumes predict future price changes. Bali and Hovakimian (2009) show that the
difference between realized and implied volatilities of individual stocks predicts the cross-
sectional variation of expected returns. Cremers and Weibaum (2010) find that deviations
from put-call parity contain information about future stock returns. Yan (2011) documents
a negative relation between the slope of implied volatility smile and stock return. In these
studies (and others), the analysis is systematically conducted at an aggregate level, e.g.,
extracting information from all current option prices, and cannot clarify the characteristics
of the individual informed trades, which is the aim of this paper.
Our paper is also related to the literature dealing with linkages of information between
option and stock markets; see, e.g., Pan and Poteshman (2006), Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson,
and Poteshman (2007), and Gaˆrleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009). Our contribution is
to clarify under which conditions such linkages occur, such as which corporate announcements
or out-of-the-money option trading precede informed trading activities.
Stephan and Whaley (1990), Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993), Manaster and Rendle-
man (1982), and Lee and Yi (2001), among others, discuss why informed traders may con-
sider options as superior trading vehicles. Our results show that option markets can offer
significant profits to informed traders, lending empirical support to these studies. Chen,
Hong, and Stein (2001) show that asset crashes can be predicted using shares trading vol-
ume. We complement this work by showing that certain increments in trading volume and
open interest have predictive power for future movements in the underlying stock. Blume,
Easley, and O’Hara (1994) and Vijh (1990) provide related studies on trading volume and
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information-related trading.
3 Detecting Option Informed Trades
We propose two methods to detect option informed trades. The first method relies on a
broad but empirically successful definition of informed trade, based on open interest and
volume, and makes use only of ex-ante information. The second method is based on a more
stringent definition of option informed trade and uses ex-post information as well.
We now describe the second method with the first method being a special case. We
define an option informed trade as follows: C1) an unusual trade in an option contract,
C2) which is made a few days before the occurrence of a specific event and generates large
gains in the following days, and C3) the position is not hedged in the stock market and not
used for hedging purposes. These three characteristics, Ci, i = 1, 2, 3, lead to the following
method to detect informed trading activities in options markets: first on each day the option
contract with largest increment in open interest (i.e., number of outstanding contracts) and
volume is identified, then the rate of return and dollar gain generated by this transaction are
calculated, and finally it is studied whether hedging occurs. Options trades which are delta
hedged or used for hedging purposes are not regarded as informed trades. The first method
relies only on characteristics C1 and C3, and their practical implementation. Importantly,
both methods require only commonly available datasets and thus can be easily applied to
detect option informed trades in various settings.
Other definitions of informed trading are probably conceivable, as informed traders can
undertake various trading activities with different degrees of complexity, splitting their orders
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or jamming their private signals. In this paper we restrict our attention to the economically
sensible informed trade characterized by Ci, i = 1, 2, 3, above. Beside the clear interpretation,
this definition of informed trade is amenable to an empirical analysis with publicly available
data.
We now explain how to detect informed trades in call options. The application to put
options can easily be deduced. In the empirical section, we apply both methods to a large
dataset of call and put options.
3.1 First Criterion: Increment in Open Interest Relative to Volume
For every call option k available at day t we compute the difference ∆OIkt := OI
k
t − OI
k
t−1,
where OIkt is its open interest at day t and := means defined as. When the option does
not exist at time t − 1, its open interest is set to zero. Since we are interested in unusual
transactions, only the option with the largest increment in open interest is considered
Xt := max
k∈Kt
∆OIkt (1)
where Kt is the set of all call options available at day t. The motivation for using open
interest is the following. Large trading volumes can emerge under various scenarios for
example when the same call option is traded several times during the day or large sell orders
are executed. In contrast large increments in open interest are usually originated by large
buy orders. These increments also imply that other long investors are unwilling to close their
positions forcing the dealer or market maker to issue new call options. Consequently, we use
large increment in open interest as a proxy for large buy orders.
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We focus on transactions for which the corresponding volume almost coincides with the
increment in open interest. Let Vt denote the daily trading volume corresponding to the
call option selected in (1). The positive difference Zt := (Vt − Xt) provides a measure of
how often the newly issued options are exchanged: the smaller the Zt, the less the new
options are traded during the day on which they are created. In that case the originator of
such transactions is not interested in intraday speculations but has reasons for keeping her
position for a longer period possibly waiting for the realization of future events.
This first criterion already allows us to identify single transactions as potential candidates
for informed trades. Let qt denote the ex-ante joint historical probability of observing unusual
large increment in open interest close to the trading volume
qt := P[X ≥ Xt, Z ≤ Zt] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1{Xi≥Xt,Zi≤Zt} (2)
where P denotes the empirical probability, N the length of the estimation window, e.g.,
N = 500 trading days, and 1{A} = 1 when the event A occurs, and zero otherwise. By
construction, low values of qt suggest that these transactions were unusual. For example
when qt = 1/N , it means that what occurred on day t has no precedents in the previous two
years.
3.2 Second Criterion: Relative Return and Realized Gain
The second criterion takes into consideration the ex-post returns and realized gains from
transactions with a low ex-ante probability qt. For each day t the trade with the largest
increment in open interest is considered. Let rmaxt denote the maximum option return gen-
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erated in the following two trading weeks
rmaxt := max
j=1,...,10
Pt+j − Pt
Pt
(3)
where Pt denotes the mid-quote price of the selected call option at day t. When r
max
t is
unusually high, an unusual event occurs during the two trading weeks.
For the computation of realized gains, we consider decrements in open interest, ∆OIkt ,
which occur when exercising or selling to the market maker the call option.3 Then we set
the American call option value to its exercise value, which is true in most cases. Given our
definition of informed trade, it is quite likely that on the event day the rise in the stock
price is large enough to reach the exercise region. If options are sold rather than exercised,
our calculation of realized gains may underestimate the actual gains. Hence reported gains
should be interpreted in a conservative manner. For brevity, we refer to decrement in open
interest as option exercise. Also, we omit the superscript k and whenever we refer to a
specific option we mean the one which was selected because of its largest increment in open
interest close to trading volume, i.e., lowest ex-ante probability qt.
Let Gt denote the corresponding cumulative gains achieved through the exercise of options
Gt :=
τt∑
t˜=t+1
((St˜ −K)
+ − Pt) (−∆OIt˜) 1{∆OIt˜<0} (4)
where τt is such that t < τt ≤ T , with T being the maturity of the selected option. If the
call options were optimally exercised (i.e., as soon as the underlying asset St˜ touches the
3On a given day, opening new positions (which increases open interest) and closing existing positions
(which decreases open interest) can off-set each other. Hence the observed decrement in open interest is a
lower bound for actual exercised or sold options.
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exercise region), the payoff (St˜ −K)
+ corresponds to the price of the option at time t˜.
The cumulative gains Gt could be easily calculated for every τt ≤ T . This has however the
disadvantage that Gt could include gains which are realized through the exercise of options
which were issued before time t.4 To avoid this inconsistency, the time τt is defined as follows
τ ∗t := arg max
l∈{t+1,...,T}


l∑
t˜=t+1
(−∆OIt˜) 1{∆OIt˜<0} ≤ Xt


τt := min(τ
∗
t , 30)
giving the informed trader no more than 30 days to collect her gains. In general the sum of
negative decrements in open interest till time τt will be smaller than the observed increment
in open interest Xt. In that case, we will add to Gt the gains realized through the fraction
of the next decrement in open interest. Hence the sum of all negative decrements in open
interest will be equal to the increment Xt.
Calculating Gt for each day t and each option in our database provides information on
whether or not option trades with a low ex-ante probability qt generate large gains through
exercise. Using the maximal return rmaxt in (3), we can calculate the time-t ex-post joint
historical probability pt of the event {Xt, Zt, r
max
t }
pt := P[X ≥ Xt, Z ≤ Zt, r
max ≥ rmaxt ] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1{Xi≥Xt,Zi≤Zt,rmaxi ≥r
max
t
}. (5)
The probability (1−pt) can be interpreted as a proxy for the probability of informed trading
4Consider for example an option which exhibits an unusually high increment in open interest at time
t, say OIt−1 = 1,000 and OIt = 3,000 resulting in Xt := OIt − OIt−1 = 2,000. Suppose that in the days
following this transaction the level of open interest decreases and after h days reaches the level OIt+h = 500.
One should only consider the gains realized through exercise till time τt ≤ t + h, where τt is such that the
sum of negative decrements in open interest during [t+ 1, τt] equals Xt = 2,000.
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in the option market. The higher (1− pt) the larger the option return and the more unusual
the increment in open interest close to trading volume.
3.3 Third Criterion: Hedging Option Position
Option trades for which the first two criteria show abnormal behavior cannot be immediately
classified as informed trading. It could be the case that such transactions were hedged by
traders using the underlying asset. Without knowing the exact composition of each trader’s
portfolio, it is not possible to assess directly whether each option trade was hedged or not.
We attempt to assess indirectly whether unusual trades in call options are actually delta
hedged using the underlying asset. The idea is to compare the theoretical total amount of
shares sold for non-hedging purposes and the actual total volume of seller-initiated transac-
tions in the underlying stock. If the latter is significantly larger than the former, then it is
likely that some of the sell-initiated trades occur for hedging purposes. In the opposite case
we conclude that the new option positions are not hedged.
One difficulty is that the volume due to hedging is typically a small component of the
total seller-initiated volume. Usually, when hedging occurs, newly issued options are hedged
on the same day which is our working assumption. Hedging analyses at the level of single
option are not possible using our OptionMetrics database. We therefore check whether all
the newly issued options are hedged on a specific day t. Given our definition of informed
option trades, such trades certainly account for a large fraction of the newly issued options.
For each day t, the total trading volume of the underlying stock is divided into seller-
and buyer-initiated using intraday volumes and transaction prices according to the Lee and
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Ready (1991) algorithm.5 Then the seller-initiated volume of underlying stock, V sellt , is
divided into trading volume due to hedging and to non-hedging purposes, V sell,hedget and
V sell,non-hedget , respectively. Let ∆
C,k
t be the delta of call option k and K
C
t be the set of call
options (newly issued or already existing) on day t. Similarly for ∆P,kt and K
P
t . Let
αt :=
∑
k∈KC
t
|OIC,kt − OI
C,k
t−1| |∆
C,k
t |, γt :=
∑
k∈KP
t
|OIP,kt −OI
P,k
t−1|∆
P,k
t ,
βt :=
∑
k∈KC
t
|∆C,kt −∆
C,k
t−1|OI
C,k
t−1, δt :=
∑
k∈KP
t
|∆P,kt −∆
P,k
t−1|OI
P,k
t−1.
The αt and γt represent the theoretical number of shares to sell for hedging the new call
options issued at day t, whereas βt and δt are the theoretical number of shares to sell to
rebalance the portfolio of existing options at day t. Absolute changes in open interests and
deltas account for the fact that each option contract has a long and short side that follow
opposite trading strategies if hedging occurs. The theoretical seller-initiated volume of stock
at day t for hedging purposes is V sell,hedge-theoryt := αt + βt + γt + δt.
When the first two criteria of our method do not signal any informed trade, we approxi-
mate V sell,hedget by V
sell,hedge-theory
t . Then the amount of stock sold for non-hedging purposes
is calculated as V sell,non-hedget = V
sell
t − V
sell,hedge-theory
t .
When informed option trades take place on day i, V sell,non-hedgei cannot be computed as in
the last equation because V sell,hedge-theoryi would be distorted by the unhedged option informed
5The algorithm states that a trade with a transaction price above (below) the prevailing quote midpoint
is classified as a buyer- (seller-) initiated trade. A trade at the quote midpoint is classified as seller-initiated
if the midpoint moved down from the previous trade (down-tick), and buyer-initiated if the midpoint moved
up (up-tick). If there was no movement from the previous price, the previous rule is successively applied to
several lags to determine whether a trade was buyer- or seller-initiated.
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trades. We circumvent this issue by forecasting the volume V sell,non-hedgei on day i using
historical data on V sell,non-hedget . The conditional distribution of V
sell,non-hedge
i is estimated
using the adjusted Nadaraya–Watson estimator and the bootstrap method proposed by Hall,
Wolff, and Yao (1999)
F˜ (y|x) =
T∑
t=1
1{Yt≤y}wt(x)KH(Xt − x)
T∑
t=1
wt(x)KH(Xt − x)
(6)
with Yt := V
sell,non-hedge
t , Xt := (|rt|, V
sell,non-hedge
t−1 ), KH(.) being a multivariate kernel with
bandwidth matrix H, wt(x) the weighting function, and rt the stock return at day t; we refer
the reader to Fan and Yao (2003) for the implementation of (6).
We can now formally test the hypothesis, H0, that hedging does not take place at day i.
Whenever the observed V selli is large enough, say above the 95% quantile of the predicted
distribution of V sell,non-hedgei , it is likely that a fraction of V
sell
i is due to hedging purposes.
Hence we reject H0 at day i when V
sell
i > q
V sell,non-hedge
i
0.95 , where q
V sell,non-hedge
i
α = F˜−1(α|Xi) is the
α-quantile of the predicted distribution of V sell,non-hedgei estimated using (6). The separate
appendix shows that the power of the test depends on the conditioning variables Xi but can
be as high as 20% when V selli is 20% larger than V
sell,non-hedge
i .
We remark that the null hypothesis H0 of no hedging (when informed trades occur)
concerns only long positions in newly issued call options. Short positions in the same call
options do not affect our hedging detection method. It is so because the total volume of the
underlying stock is divided into buyer- and seller-initiated and only the latter matters when
hedging long call options.
15
3.4 Detecting Option Informed Trades Combining the Three Criteria
Let kt denote the selected informed trade at day t in call option k. The two methods to
detect option informed trades can be described using the following four sets of events: Ω1
:= {kt such that qt ≤ 5%}; Ω2 := {kt such that “H0 : non-hedging” not rejected at day t};
Ω3 := {kt such that r
max
t ≥ q
rmax
t
0.90 }; Ω4 := {kt such that Gt ≥ q
Gt
0.98}. The first method
detects an informed option trade when it belongs to the first two sets, i.e., kt ∈ Ω1 ∩ Ω2.
According to the second method an option trade is informed when it belongs to all four sets,
i.e., kt ∈ Ω1 ∩ Ω2 ∩ Ω3 ∩ Ω4.
4 Data
To keep the empirical analysis manageable, we focus on three main sectors, i.e., banking,
insurance, and airline, and within each sector we consider some of the main companies. In
addition, we also consider a number of randomly selected companies from other sectors, such
as Coca-cola and Philip Morris, to broaden our empirical analysis.
We organize our dataset in two parts. The first part includes only put options, the second
part put and call options.
The first part of our dataset includes 14 companies from airline, banking and various
other sectors. The list of companies includes: American Airlines (AMR), United Airlines
(UAL), Delta Air Lines (DAL), Boeing (BA) and KLM for the airline sector; Bank of Amer-
ica (BAC), Citigroup (C), J.P. Morgan (JPM), Merrill Lynch (MER) and Morgan Stanley
(MWD) for the banking sector; and AT&T (ATT), Coca-Cola (KO), Hewlett Packard (HP),
and Philip Morris (MO) for the remaining sectors. Options data are from the Chicago Board
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Options Exchange (CBOE) as provided by OptionMetrics. The dataset includes the daily
cross-section of available put options for each company from January 1996 to April 2006 and
amounts to about 2.1 million of options. Options data for DAL and KLM were available for
somewhat shorter periods. Stock prices are downloaded from OptionMetrics as well to avoid
non-synchronicity issues and are adjusted for stock splits and spin-offs using information
from the CRSP database. Intraday transaction prices and volumes for each underlying stock
price are from NYSE’s Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. This database consists of several
millions of records for each stock and is necessary to classify trading volumes in buyer- and
seller-initiated in order to complete the analysis related to the hedging criterion. Discrep-
ancies among datasets have been carefully taken into account when merging databases.6
Additionally, we analyze put options on 3 European companies, Swiss Re, Munich Re and
EADS, using daily data from the EUREX provided by Deutsche Bank.
The second part of our dataset includes 19 companies from the banking and insurance
sectors. Put and call options data are from January 1996 to September 2009, covering
the recent financial crisis, and amounts to about 7.5 million options. The list of American
companies includes: American International Group (AIG), Bank of America Corporation
(BAC), Bear Stearns Corporation (BSC), Citigroup (C), Fannie Mae (FNM), Freddie Mac
(FRE), Goldman Sachs (GS), J.P. Morgan (JPM), Lehman Brothers (LEH), Merrill Lynch
(MER), Morgan Stanley (MS), Wachovia Bank (WB) and Wells Fargo Company (WFC).
Most of these companies belong to the list of banks which were bailed out and, in which,
6For example data for J.P. Morgan from OptionMetrics and TAQ do not match. Whereas the stock
volume reported in OptionMetrics for the years 1996–2000 is given by the sum of the volume of Chase
Manhattan Corporation and J.P. Morgan & Co. (Chase Manhattan Corporation acquired J.P. Morgan &
Co. in 2000), TAQ only reports the volume of J.P. Morgan & Co. Same issue was found for BankAmerica
Corporation and NationsBank Corporation, whose merger took place in 1998 under the new name of Bank
of America Corporation.
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the American Treasury Department invested approximately $200 billion through its Capital
Purchase Program in an effort to bolster capital and support new lending. Options and stock
data are from the same databases as before, namely CBOE, TAQ, and CRSP. Furthermore
we analyze 6 European banks: UBS, Credit Suisse Group (CS) and Deutsche Bank (DBK)
whose options are traded on EUREX, and Societe´ Ge´ne´rale (GL), HSBC (HSB) and BNP
Paribas (BN) with options listed on Euronext. Options data as well as intraday transaction
prices and volumes for the underlying stock are obtained from EUREX provided by Deutsche
Bank, and from EURONEXT provided by NYSE Euronext database. All analyzed options
are American style.
5 Empirical Results
The two proposed methods to detect option informed trades are applied to the companies
listed in the previous section. The first method, which relies only on ex-ante information,
aims at detecting informed trades as soon as they take place. On average, less than 0.1% of
the total analyzed trades belongs to the set Ω1 ∩ Ω2 defined in Section 3.4. As an example
for AMR our first method detects 141 option informed trades, the total number of analyzed
options being more than 137,000. This suggests that already the ex-ante method can be
quite effective in signaling informed trades.
The second method, which relies also on ex-post information, selects a significantly
smaller number of option informed trades. For example, only 5 informed trades are de-
tected for AMR. Importantly, the empirical patterns of option informed trades based on
the two methods are roughly the same. For example, both methods suggest that most in-
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formed trades for AMR occur before an acquisition announcement in May 2000 and the 9/11
terrorist attacks.
Due to space constraints we can only report the details of transactions selected by the ex-
post method. The separate appendix reports a detailed analysis of various detected option
informed trades.
Analyzing the first part of our dataset, 37 transactions on the CBOE have been identified
as belonging to the set Ω1 ∩ Ω2 ∩ Ω3 ∩ Ω4 defined in Section 3.4. Nearly all the detected
events can be assigned to one of the following three event categories: merger and acquisition
(M&A) announcements, 6 transactions; quarterly financial/earnings related statements, 14
transactions; and the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 13 transactions. 4 transactions
could not be identified.
4 informed trades around M&A announcements are detected in the airline sector. These
option trades have underlying stock American Airlines and United Airlines. 3 informed
trades took place on May 10th and 11th, 2000, two weeks before UAL’s acquisition of US
Airways was announced.7 Another informed trade took place on January 9th, 2003 with
underlying Delta Air Lines, a few weeks before a public announcement on January 21st,
2003 related to the planned alliance among Delta, Northwest and Continental. In both
cases, the underlying assets crashed at the public announcements, generating large gains ($3
and $1 million, respectively) through the exercise of these put options.
7As reported in the New York Times edition of May 25th, 2000, AMR was considered the company
most threatened by the merger, explaining therefore the 17% drop in its stock in the days after the public
announcement. According to James Goodwin, chairman and chief executive of UAL, two major hurdles
would challenge UAL: “the first is to get US Airways shareholders to approve this transaction. [The second]
is the regulatory work, which revolves around the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice
and the European Union”. The skepticism on Wall Street was immediately reflected on UAL shares which
declined $7.19 to $53.19 on the announcement day.
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In the airline sector 8 out of 15 of the selected transactions can be traced back to the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. Companies like American Airlines, United Airlines, Boeing and to
a lesser extent Delta Air Lines and KLM seem to have been targets for informed trading ac-
tivities in the period leading up to the attacks. The number of new put options issued during
that period is statistically high and the total gains Gt realized by exercising these options
amount to more than $16 million. These findings support the evidence in Poteshman (2006)
who also documents unusual activities in the option market before the terrorist attacks. The
separate appendix discusses in details our detected option informed trades before 9/11.
In the banking sector 14 informed trading activities are detected, 6 related to quarterly
financial/earnings announcements, 5 to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, and 3 not
identified. For example the number of put options with underlying stock Bank of America,
Citigroup, J.P. Morgan and Merrill Lynch issued in the days before the terrorist attacks was
also at an unusually high level. The realized gains from such trading strategies are around
$11 million.
The last set of companies we analyze includes AT&T, Coca Cola, Hewlett Packard and
Philip Morris. 2 informed trades occurred before the announcement of the M&A deal between
Coca Cola and Procter&Gamble announced on February 21st, 2001 (leading to gains of more
than $2 million), and 5 transactions preceding the publication of quarterly financial/earnings
statements. News related to earnings shortfalls, unexpected drops in sales and production
scale backs are the most common in this last category. For example 3 informed trades in
put options with underlying Philip Morris stock are detected. These trades took place a few
days before three separate legal cases against the company seeking a total amount of more
than $50 million in damages for smokers’ deaths and inoperable lung cancer. The realized
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gains amounted to more than $10 million. Perhaps as expected, no informed option trade
is detected with underlying the previous companies in the days leading up to the terrorist
attacks of September 11th. Tables 1 and 2 provide further details on option informed trades
for the airline sector. To save space, corresponding tables for the banking sector and the last
group of companies are collected in the separate appendix.
The second part of our dataset focuses on the banking and insurance sectors. To save
space the empirical results are collected in the separate appendix. Although the sample
period spans almost 15 years, from January 1996 to September 2009, the vast majority of
detected informed trades occur during the Subprime crisis 2007–2009. Large movements
in underlying stocks lead relatively quickly to net profits of more than $1 million through
option trading. Those profits are generally larger than the ones calculated in the first part
of our dataset. Due to the rapid collapse of the financial system, the number of corporate
and governmental decisions made has sharply increased, giving rise to numerous potential
information leakages and informed trading activities.
To provide further insights on option informed trading, below we discuss in detail the
case of an acquisition announcement in the U.S. airline sector in May 2000. Additional cases
are discussed in the separate appendix.
The ex-post method detects two put option informed trades on May 10th and 11th, 2000.
They involved AMR and UAL. On May 10th and 11th, the number of options issued with
strike $35 and maturity June 2000 with underlying AMR is very large: 3,374 on May 10th and
5,720 the day after (at 99.7% and 99.9% quantile of their two-year empirical distributions,
respectively). These transactions correspond to those which exhibit the strongest increments
in open interest during a span of five years; see upper left graph in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
21
On May 10th, the underlying stock had a value of $35.50 and the selected put was traded
at $2.25. For UAL 2,505 put option contracts (at 98.7% quantile of its two-year empirical
distribution) with strike $65 and the same maturity as those of AMR were issued on May
11th at the price of $5.25 when the underlying had a value of $61.50. The market conditions
under which such transactions took place are stable. For example the average return of the
stock the week before is, in both cases, positive and less than 0.5%.
The days of the drop in the underlying stock are May 24th and May 25th, 2000, with
the first day corresponding to the public announcement of United Airline’s regarding a $4.3
billion acquisition of US Airways. As reported in the May 25th, 2000 edition of the New York
Times, “shares of UAL and those of its main rivals crashed” (for details see Footnote 7). The
stock price of AMR dropped to $27.13 (−23.59% of value losses when compared to the stock
price on May 11th) increasing the value of the put options to $7.88 (resulting in a return of
250% in two trading weeks). The same impact can be found for UAL: the stock price after
the public announcement dropped to $52.50 (−14.63% when compared to the value on May
11th) raising the put’s value to $12.63 (corresponding to a return of 140% in two trading
weeks). In the case of AMR, the decline in the underlying stock can be seen in Figure 2,
where the option return largely increased.
On the day of the public announcement 4,735 put options of AMR were exercised; see
Figure 2. After this large decrement in open interest, 1,494 and 1,376 additional put options
were exercised in the following two days respectively (reflected in additional drops in open
interests in Figure 2). The unusual increments in open interest observed on May 10th and
May 11th are therefore off set by the exercise of options when the underlying crashed. The
corresponding gains Gt from this strategy are more than $1.6 million within two trading
22
weeks. These are graphically shown in the lower graph in Figure 1, from which we can see
how fast these gains were realized. In the case of UAL similar conclusions can be reached;
see Tables 1 and 2. Based on these trades, a total gain of almost $3 million was realized
within a few trading weeks using options with underlying AMR and UAL. The non-hedging
hypothesis cannot be rejected suggesting that such trades are unhedged option positions.
6 Controlling False Discoveries in Option Informed Trades
Any statistical method can generate false discoveries in informed trades. In other words,
the probability that an option trade can satisfy various criteria simply by chance is not
zero. Controlling for false discovery is then an important task which allows to separate truly
informed traders with high gains from uninformed traders which luckily achieved also high
gains. To separate the two groups of traders we use a multiple hypothesis testing technique.
Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) adopted a similar approach to discriminate between
skilled and lucky mutual fund managers based on fund performance.
Suppose we observe option returns generated by M traders characterized by different
degrees of information, ranging from highly accurate private information to no information
(or possibly even misleading information). Let pi0 denote the fraction of uninformed traders
and δm, m = 1, . . . ,M , the expected return generated by traderm. Under the null hypothesis
all option traders are uninformed. Formally, this multiple hypothesis reads H0,m : δm =
0, m = 1, . . . ,M . Each hypothesis is tested at significance level γ (e.g., 10%) using a two-
side t-statistic, i.e., H0,m is rejected when the corresponding t-statistic is either below the
5th or above the 95th percentiles of its distribution under H0,m. When the null hypothesis is
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true, all p-values based on t-statistics are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. When the
null hypothesis is not true, large option returns and corresponding low p-values are generated
by both informed and lucky traders. Under such alternative hypothesis, denote E[S+γ ] the
expected fraction of p-values below γ/2 corresponding to positive and significant t-statistics.
The key step is to adjust E[S+γ ] for the presence of lucky traders. The expected fraction of
truly informed traders is E[T+γ ] = E[S
+
γ ] − pi0 γ/2.
8 The last step is the estimation of pi0.
Intuitively, large p-values correspond to estimated δm not statistically away from zero and
hence generated by uninformed traders. The fraction of p-values above a certain threshold
λ is extrapolated over the interval [0, 1]. Multiplying this fraction of p-values by 1/(1 − λ)
provides an estimate of pi0. This estimation approach has been developed by Storey (2002);
see, e.g., Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2008) for a review. We choose λ using the data-driven
approach in Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010). The observed fraction of positive and
significant t-statistics provides an unbiased estimate of E[S+γ ].
Obviously, we do not observe option returns achieved by traders with various degrees of
private information. Consistently with our detection method, we use the historical probabil-
ity qt of observing unusual increments in open interest and volume, as well as high gains, as a
proxy for private information. The working assumption is that the smaller such probability,
the higher the degree of private information of the option trader.
For every underlying asset, for every day t, and for every option trade k = 1, . . . , Kt in our
sample, we compute the historical probability qkt as in (2) of observing an increment ∆OI
k
t in
open interest and distance Zkt := (V
k
t −∆OI
k
t ) between trading volume and increment in open
8As under the null hypothesis all traders are uninformed, i.e., pi0 = 1, and half the size of the test
γ/2 = E[S+γ ], the expected fraction of truly informed traders is E[T
+
γ ] = 0.
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interest, and high gains as in (5). By definition, the probability qkt lies in the interval [0, 1].
We sort in ascending order all qkt and divide such unit interval into M = 1,000 subintervals
I1, . . . , IM such that in every subinterval the same number of q
k
t is available. Then we group
all option trades qkt and corresponding returns r
k
t according to which subinterval Im they
belong. This procedure allows us to construct M hypothetical option traders, each one
of them characterized by a different degree of private information and option returns. In
subintervals Im, m = 1, . . . ,M , the lower m, the more informed the trader is, and therefore,
the more likely it is that she will generate large positive return rkt . Within each subinterval
Im, we regress unadjusted annualized option returns r
k
t on a subinterval-specific constant δm,
estimating the expected return of trader m.9
As an example Figure 3 shows estimated δm for American Airlines. Estimates for the
remaining companies are similar. The lower m, the higher the estimated δm, and the relation
is nearly monotonic. Moreover, for small m, the estimated δm are positive and significant,
whereas for increasing m, δm becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. This finding
suggests that qkt is a sensible proxy for private information in option trades.
We briefly discuss now the estimates of false discovery rates for American Airlines and
Citigroup. For the remaining companies, similar results have been found. Because of space
constraints, figures and tables are not reported but available upon request from the authors.
For AMR, the total number of analyzed option trades amounts at 137,000, implying that
each regression coefficient δm has been computed by relaying on 137 option returns r
k
t . The
9In the regression, we do not adjust option returns for market return or any other variable because
the focus is on the ability of the option trader to generate large returns, including those returns based
on predicting future market or other variable movements. In order to make least squares estimation more
robust we exclude negative returns below the 5% empirical quantile. The impact of winsorizing on the false
discovery rate is virtually negligible.
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expected fraction of truly informed traders has been estimated to be E[T+] = 9.8% (with
standard error 1.15%, optimal λ = 0.65, and γ = 0.11), corresponding to 98 traders. As the
ex-ante procedure detects 141 trades for AMR, the test result suggests that some of these
trades may be actually uninformed. In contrast, the ex-post procedure is more conservative
and detects only 5 informed trades, which implies that these trades are most likely informed.
For the case of Citigroup, option trades amount at 246,000 and the estimated fraction of
truly informed traders E[T+] = 10.6% (with standard error 1.09%, optimal λ = 0.612, and γ
= 0.07), corresponding to 106 traders. The ex-post method detects only 2 informed option
trades. Thus also in this case the detection procedure is conservative and detected trades
are most likely informed. For the remaining companies we found similar results.
Finally, to assess the ability of the FDR test at controlling for false discoveries, we run the
following experiment.10 We identify the major natural disasters, such as floods, hurricanes,
volcanic eruptions, oil spills, and earthquakes from 2000 to 2011. As the exact timing of the
event is in principle unpredictable, this should rule out informed trades. Then, we consider
all the option trades over the two weeks prior to the relevant event in the companies that
were affected ex-post by the event. Given the setup, no option trade should be classified as
informed.
Table 3 provides the list of natural disasters and affected companies, as well as the
rationale for including these companies. For example we consider British Petroleum before
the oil spill in the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2010. The list of companies is constrained by option
data availability, i.e., open interest and volume for individual options. Computing qt as in
(2) and considering qt < 5%, a very small number of suspicious option trades is detected
10We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this experiment.
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over the two weeks prior to a natural disaster. When applying the FDR test all such trades
are attributed to luck, confirming the validity of our procedure. Detailed test results are
available from the authors upon request.
7 Robustness Checks
The input parameters in our detection procedure are: the length N of the estimation window,
chosen to be N = 500 trading days, used for the computation of the ex-ante probability qt,
the conditional distribution of V sell,non-hedget , and the quantiles q
rmax
t
α and q
Gt
α′ ; the time period
after the transaction day used for the computation of rmaxt , chosen to be 10 trading days;
the time horizon τt used for the calculation of the gains Gt, chosen to be 30 trading days;
the quantile levels α and α′ in q
rmax
t
α and q
Gt
α′ used for the computation of the sets Ω3 and Ω4,
chosen to be α = 90% and α′ = 98%; the probability level used to select trades belonging
to the set Ω1, chosen to be 5%. In what follows we set the input parameters to different
values and we repeat all previous analysis for all companies. To save space we report only
some of the results and for a few companies giving a sense of the robustness of our results.
Additional results are available from the authors upon request.
When varying the length of the estimation window N between 200 and 1,000, (all other
parameters being unchanged) the number of selected transactions does not change signifi-
cantly. For example in the case of AMR, we selected 5 informed trades when considering the
last two trading years (N = 500 days); for N ∈ [200, 1000] the number of detected informed
trades ranges between 4 and 6; for UAL, we detected 2 informed trades when considering the
last two trading years (N = 500 days); this number remains unchanged with respect to the
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original choice for N > 450 and decreases by one when N ∈ [200, 450]. In the case of BAC
and AT&T, the deviation from the original number of selected trades is less than 2. With
respect to the choice of the time period used for the computation of rmaxt and τt, our results
are also robust. We let the length of the first period vary in the range [1, 30] days and the
second one in [1,40] days. In the case of AMR, the number of transactions ranges from 2 to
8, being therefore centered around the original number and with a small deviation from it.
For UAL, the corresponding range is from 1 to 4, for BAC from 2 to 8 and for AT&T from 1
to 6. The number of detected trades is obviously a decreasing function of α and α′ (all other
parameters being unchanged). In the case of AMR, when {α, α′} ∈ [0.85, 0.95] × [0.96, 1],
the number of transactions selected does not exceed 15. For UAL, the number of selected
trades varies between 1 and 10, for BAC between 5 and 25, and for AT&T between 1 and 18.
Finally, with respect to the probability level used to determine the set Ω1, our findings are
very robust as well. When increasing the level from 1% to 10%, the number of trades selected
for AMR varies between 1 and 6; for UAL it ranges between 2 to 4, for BAC and AT&T
from 1 to 7. We simultaneously changed several parameters and found that the number of
detected transactions does not change significantly and in almost all cases in steps of one.
We recall that approximately 9.6 million of options are analyzed. Based on these results, we
conclude that our findings are robust.
8 Conclusion
We develop two statistical methods to detect informed trading activities in the options mar-
kets. We apply these methods to a large dataset uncovering various features of option in-
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formed trading. Detected option informed trades tend to cluster prior to certain events (such
as acquisition or financial disruption announcements), involve often liquid options (which is
consistent with informed traders attempting not to immediately reveal their private signals),
generate easily large gains exceeding millions (which is likely a conservative estimate), and
are not contemporaneously reflected in the underlying stock price (which has implications
for trading strategies). These findings are not driven by false discoveries in informed trades
which are controlled using a multiple hypothesis testing technique.
Our findings have policy, pricing, and market efficiency implications. If some of the
detected informed trades are indeed illegal, for example originated by insiders, it can be
optimal for regulators to expend relatively more monitoring efforts on the options markets.
Pricing models should account for all relevant current information. However nearly all option
prices (and underlying assets) involved in informed trades do not show any specific reaction
to large increments in open interest and volume. The strong movements in detected options
are simply due to subsequent large movements in stock prices originated by specific firm
news. Finally, our findings suggest that certain increments in open interest and volume
may predict large price movements and simple option trading strategies can generate large
returns. Further research is necessary to assess whether those returns are truly abnormal,
questioning market efficiency, or rather reflect compensation for risk factors.
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Summary of Airline Sector Jan 1996 - Apr 2006
Day Id S/K τ OIt−1 ∆OIt q∆OIt ∆OI
tot
t
Volt rmaxt τ2 Gt τ3 %ex. qt p-value 1− pt
American Airlines (AMR) Jan 1996 - Apr 2006
10 May 00 10821216 1.01 38 20 3374 99.7% 3378 3290 106% 9 906,763 11 100% 0.002 0.286 0.998
11 May 00 10821216 1.02 37 3394 5720 99.9% 5442 5320 98% 10 1,647,844 11 100% 0.002 0.349 0.998
31 Aug 01 20399554 0.91 22 96 473 95.7% 571 500 455% 7 662,200 11 100% 0.016 0.645 0.984
10 Sep 01 20428354 0.99 40 258 1312 98.5% 1701 1535 453% 2 1,179,171 26 100% 0.012 0.096 0.998
24 Aug 05 27240699 0.97 24 1338 4378 93.5% 8395 5319 163% 8 575,105 17 100% 0.048 0.123 0.952
United Airlines (UAL) Jan 1996 - Jan 2003
11 May 00 11332850 0.95 37 35 2505 98.7% 2534 2505 132% 10 1,156,313 26 100% 0.002 0.373 0.998
6 Sep 01 20444473 1.06 44 21 1494 96.3% 1189 2000 1322% 7 1,980,387 28 100% 0.030 0.165 0.998
Delta Air Lines (DAL) Jan 1996 - May 2005
*1 Oct 98 10904865 1.01 16 140 974 97.7% 483 924 261% 6 537,594 12 100% 0.016 0.000 0.996
29 Aug 01 20402792 0.98 24 1061 202 89.7% 224 215 1033% 9 328,200 13 100% 0.044 0.528 0.998
19 Sep 02 20718332 0.99 30 275 1728 98.7% 550 1867 132% 7 331,676 22 100% 0.004 0.190 0.998
9 Jan 03 21350972 1.10 44 274 3933 99.7% 4347 4512 112% 9 1,054,217 30 100% 0.002 0.065 0.998
Boeing (BA) Jan 1996 - Apr 2006
24 Nov 98 10948064 0.99 53 3758 1047 93.5% 1285 1535 467% 7 883,413 24 100% 0.040 0.481 0.996
29 Aug 01 20400312 0.92 24 1019 2828 96.7% 3523 3805 382% 10 1,972,534 8 100% 0.028 0.252 0.998
5 Sep 01 20429078 1.01 45 472 1499 92.1% 2538 1861 890% 8 1,805,929 22 100% 0.048 0.085 0.998
6 Sep 01 11839316 0.75 135 13228 7105 99.3% 13817 7108 118% 7 2,704,701 3 100% 0.006 0.150 0.998
*7 Sep 01 20400311 0.90 15 7995 4179 98.5% 4887 5675 306% 6 5,775,710 7 100% 0.016 0.000 0.998
*17 Sep 01 20400309 0.90 5 116 5026 98.9% 2704 5412 124% 4 2,663,780 5 100% 0.010 0.000 0.998
KLM Jan 1996 - Nov 2001
5 Sep 01 20296159 0.91 17 3 100 99.3% 34 100 467% 9 53976 9 100% 0.006 0.368 0.998
Table 1: This table shows day on which the transaction took place, Day; identification number of the put option, Id; moneyness, i.e., stock price
divided by strike price, S/K; time-to-maturity, τ ; level of open interest the day before the informed trade, OIt−1; increment in open interest from day
t− 1 to day t, ∆OIt; its quantile with respect to its empirical distribution computed over the last two years, q
∆OI
t ; total increment in open interest,
i.e., when considering all the available options at day t and not only the ones which had the highest increment, ∆OItott ; corresponding volume, Volt;
maximum return realized by the selected option during the two-week period following the transaction day, rmaxt ; number of days between transaction
day t and when this maximum return occurs, τ2; gains realized through the exercise of the option issued at time t as in (4), Gt; minimum between
the number of days (starting from the transaction day) needed for the exercise of ∆OIt and 30 days, τ3; percentage of ∆OIt exercised within the first
30 days after the transaction, %ex.; ex-ante probability in (2), qt; p-value of the hypothesis that delta hedging does not take place at time t, p-value;
proxy for the probability of informed trading in (5), 1− pt.
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Summary of Airline Sector Jan 1996 - Apr 2006
Day of transaction Market condition Return Crash in stock Event’s description
American Airlines (AMR) Jan 1996 - Apr 2006
10 May 00 0.4% −17.6% 24/25 May 00 Announcement 24 May 00: Airline Deal UAL’s acquisition of US Airways
11 May 00 0.0% −17.6% 24/25 May 00 Announcement 24 May 00: Airline Deal UAL’s acquisition of US Airways
31 Aug 01 −0.4% −39.4% 17 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
10 Sep 01 −1.4% −39.4% 17 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
24 Aug 05 0.4% −5.3% 30 Aug 05 August 05: Hurricane Katrina, interrupted production on the gulf coast, jet fuel prices ↑
United Airlines (UAL) Jan 1996 - Jan 2003
11 May 00 0.3% −12% 24 May 00 Announcement 24 May 00: Airline Deal UAL’s acquisition of US Airways
6 Sep 01 −1.0% −43.2% 17 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
Delta Air Lines (DAL) Jan 1996 - May 2005
*1 Oct 98 −1.7% −11.4% 07/08 Oct 98 Not identified
29 Aug 01 0.0% −44.6% 17 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
19 Sep 02 −5.2% −24.4% 27 Sep 02 Announcement 27 Sep 02: Expected loss for 3rd quarter
9 Jan 03 2.1% −15.7% 21/22 Jan 03 Announcement 21 Jan 03: Restrictions on planned alliance of Delta, Northwest and Continental
Boeing (BA) Jan 1996 - Apr 2006
24 Nov 98 −0.2% −22.0% 02/03 Dec 98 Announcement 02 Dec 98: production scale back and cut in work forces
29 Aug 01 −0.4% −25.0% 17/18 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
5 Sep 01 −0.8% −25.0% 17/18 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
6 Sep 01 −0.9% −25.0% 17/18 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
*7 Sep 01 −1.9% −25.0% 17/18 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
*17 Sep 01 −5.6% −25.0% 17/18 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
KLM Jan 1996 - Nov 2001
5 Sep 01 −1.9% −31.6% 17/18 Sep 01 9/11 Terrorist attacks in New York
Table 2: This table shows day on which the transaction took place, Day of transaction; market condition at day t measured by the average return
of the underlying stock during the last two trading weeks, Market condition; minimum return of the underlying stock during the two-week period
following the transaction day, Return (comparable with rmaxt ); day when the underlying stock drops, Crash in stock; short description of the event
and why the stock drops, Event’s description. * means that the hypothesis of non-hedging can be rejected at a 5% level.
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Natural Disasters and False Discoveries of Informed Trades
Event Date Company
Central Europe floods 11 Aug 02 Advanced Micro Devices
Hurricane Katrina 29 Aug 05 ExxonMobil
Eruptions of Eyjafjallajo¨kull (Iceland) 14 Apr 10 FedEX
Deepwater Horizon oil spill 20 Apr 10 British Petroleum
Japan earthquake 11 Mar 11 British Petroleum
Table 3: This table lists some of the natural disasters that occurred between 2000 and 2011, the date of
the event, and some of the companies that were affected ex-post by the event. The rationale for including
the companies is the following. Central Europe floods: Advanced Micro Devices was operating a main chip
fabrication plant in Dresden which was eventually only marginally affected by the floods. Hurricane Katrina:
ExxonMobil was operating a major refinery near the U.S. Gulf Coast. Eruptions of Eyjafjallajo¨kull: the
International Air Transport Association imposed an air travel ban and transportation companies like FedEX
were negatively affected. Deepwater Horizon oil spill: British Petroleum was responsible for the oil spill and
operated the oil prospect. Japan earthquake: the earthquake has led to a fall in the oil price, which has
added to pressure on British Petroleum’s share price.
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Figure 1: Upper graphs show on the x-axis maximal daily increment in open interest across all
put options with underlying American Airlines (AMR), and on the y-axis the corresponding
trading volume. Upper-left graph covers the period January 1997 – December 2001, upper-
right graphs the period January 1997 – January 2006. Lower graph shows cumulative gains
Gt in USD as in equation (4) for detected option informed trade on AMR. Gains correspond
to those realized by daily exercising/selling the options.
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Figure 2: Selected put option for informed trading with underlying stock American Airlines
(AMR) before the United Airlines (UAL) announcement of $4.3 billion acquisition of US
Airways in May 2000. The solid line shows the daily dynamic of open interest, the bars
show the corresponding trading volume (left y-axis) and the dash-dot line the option return
(right y-axis). The empty circle is the day of the transaction, the filled circle is the day of
the announcement (partially covered by the highest bar). This put option had a strike of
$35 and matured at the end of June 2000.
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Figure 3: False Discovery Rate for American Airlines. The upper-left graph shows on the x-axis the probability qt (the right-end
point in each subinterval Im), and on the y-axis the corresponding average option returns δm associated to themth option trader.
The upper-right graph shows the same quantities when 0 ≤ qt ≤ 0.01. Dashed-dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals
for δm. The lower graphs, from left to right, show t-statistics of option returns associated to the M option traders for the null
hypothesis H0 : δm = 0, m = 1, . . . ,M , p-values, and frequency histogram of p-values, respectively.
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